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Abstract. This article examines the psychology of causal attributions concerning the merits of the United
States Government signing the Kyoto Protocol and of two main operational mechanisms for controlling
emissions of heat-trapping gases.
Stuart Eizenstat, the United States (US) Undersecretary of State for Economic Affairs, has stated that the
US Government's signing of the Kyoto Protocol would likely have the consequences of increasing USG
negotiating leverage for the many policy Issues remaining to be worked out. However, many
representatives of the U.S. coal and automobile and their U.S. Congressional supporters maintain that
the signing will decrease USG leverage. Given that the signing has occurred, the lay scientist might well
believe that time will tell, as to which opposing side will be right.
But, not so fast. If publicly advocated USG negotiating positions are frequently rejected, signing
opponents will puff out their chests in the smug satisfaction of being right while signing supporters may
assert that without the signing an even smaller n umber of negotiation positions would have been
accepted. If publicly advocated positions are frequently accepted, signing supporters will exhibit the
chest-puffing, while opponents may claim that the frequency accepted should have been much higher.
The rhetorical devices used to maintain one's initial public stance obfuscate the already complex task of
attempting to discern cause and effect. This obfuscation is quite useful because the more significant
source of conflict between the opposing sides has much less to do with the consequences of signing
than the validity of global warming, the putative relationship between environmental initiative and
economic health and development, and the attractiveness of internationalism versus nationalism.
Another environmental conflict comprises the relative merits of emissions trading versus clean
development mechanisms as operational mechanisms for controlling emissions. The former entails a
country or company achieving credit for emission reductions by buying reductions from another country
or company that has reduced its emissions more than is required. The latter entails a country or
company investing in emission-reduction projects in developing countries. In this case, both the investor
and the recipient of the investment would share credit for the emissions reductions achieved.
The USG and its allies among the developed countries advocate no restrictions on emissions trading
because such restrictions would attenuate the mechanism's cost-cutting value and attenuate the total
amount of emissions worldwide. On the other hand, many developing countries term emissions trading
a means for the USG and its allies to escape any negative economic consequences of environmental
initiative. Instead, these developing countries prefer clean development mechanisms--even though the
latter also allows the USG and its allies a similar escape. In fact, many developing countries may well
prefer clean market mechanisms because such mechanisms allow these countries to escape negative
economic consequences as well--more than the more moderate escape obtained through emissions
trading. This last point is reinforced by the observation that--until very recently--virtually all developing
countries refused to consider lowering their emissions until the developed countries actually attained
suitable emissions reductions.
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The bottom line--for protocol signing and for operational mechanisms of emissions reductions--appears
to be self-interest. If environmental initiative can be crafted to appeal to self-interest, the most resilient
of ideological, economic, and political concerns may suddenly be viewed as manageable. The hot air of
political dialogue will then go up in smoke. (See Cushman, J.H., Jr. (November 13, 1998). U.S. signs a pact
to reduce gases tied to warming. The New York Times, http://www.nytimes.co m; Gifford, R., & Hine,
D.W. (1997). Toward cooperation in commons dilemmas. Canadian Journal of Behavioural Science, 29,
167-179; Goetze, D. (1994). Comparing prisoner's dilemma, commons dilemma, and public goods
provision designs in laboratory experiments. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 38, 56-86; Hine, D.W., &
Gifford, R. (1996). Attributions about self and others in commons dilemmas. European Journal of Social
Psychology, 26, 429-445; Kollock, P. (1998). Social dilemmas: the anatomy of cooperation. Annual
Review of Sociology, 24, 183-214; McCusker, C., & Carnevale, P.J. (1995). Framing in resource dilemmas:
Loss aversion and the moderating effects of sanctions. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision
Processes, 61, 190-201; Stevens, W.K. (November 14, 1998). Key questions remain at global-warming
talks. The New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com.) (Keywords: Clean Development Mechanism,
Emissions Trading, Environment, Kyoto Protocol.)
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